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Failing to mitigate propagation of disease spread can result in dire economic consequences for
agricultural networks. Pathogens like Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv), can quickly spread
among producers. Biosecurity - sanitary regulations, procedures and equipment, along with dis-
ease prevention measures, such as vaccines - is designed to prevent infection transmission. When
considering biosecurity investments, management must balance the cost of protection versus the
consequences of contracting an infection. Thus, an examination of the decision-making processes
associated with investment in biosecurity is important for enhancing system-wide biosecurity. To
that end, data gathered from digital field experiments can provide insights into behavioral strategies
and inform the development of decision support systems. We created an online digital experiment to
simulate outbreak scenarios among swine production supply chains, where participants were tasked
with making biosecurity investment decisions. Two experiments were conducted: Experiment One
assessed behavioral strategies using Amazon Mechanical Turk and Experiment Two examined differ-
ences between industry specialists and Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. In Experiment One,
we quantified the risk associated with each participants decisions and delineated three dominant
categories of risk attitudes: risk averse, risk tolerant, and opportunistic. Each risk class exhibited
unique risk mitigation approaches in reaction to risk and disease information. Risk averse individu-
als implement the most protection in response to increased risk associated with an outbreak. Risk
tolerant players generally gambled with little protection hoping to maximize their payout. Oppor-
tunists switched behavioral strategies depending upon the risk to their facilities with high allocation
in high risk scenarios and low allocation in low risk scenarios. We also tested how information
uncertainty affects risk aversion, by varying the amount of visibility of the infection as well as the
amount of biosecurity implemented across the system. We found evidence that more visibility in the
number of infected sites increases risk averse behaviors, while more visibility in the amount of neigh-
boring biosecurity increased risk taking behaviors. In Experiment Two, we were surprised to find no
evidence for differences in behavior of livestock specialists compared to Amazon Mechanical Turk
participants. This result may stem from variability in the objectives that livestock participants
attempt to optimize due to their industry experience, or because a larger number of individuals
would need to be sampled to observe differences. Our findings provide support for using digital field
experiments to study how risk communication affects behavior, which can provide insights towards
more effective messaging strategies.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
Circumventing exposure to an outbreak can require
economic foresight and ambition. For managers of agri-
cultural production facilities, biosecurity investment de-
cisions can be challenging, as biosecurity practices are
costly and the return on investment can be difficult to
quantify (e.g., efficacy uncertainty). At what perceived
levels of risk will individuals invest resources to miti-
gate their chances of becoming infected? For many, this
decision-making process is multi-factored and dynamic,
where many factors can change over time depending on
past experiences [9, 57]. In [33], the psychosocial factors
motivating biosecurity adoption with respect to risk at-
titudes, adherence, and resistance to behavioral change
initiatives was shown to be an urgent topic for contin-
ued investigation and policy consideration. Studying risk
mitigation behavioral strategies can help us understand
how information and perceived risk affects the decision-
making process.
Livestock epidemics can cause substantial economic
damage to agricultural industries, [42] estimates a net
annual cost of $900 million to $1.8 billion from PEDv
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2outbreaks. Particularly transmissible pathogens, like
Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv) can spread
quickly throughout supply chain networks resulting in
high mortality rates [28, 50] and can often reoccur even
after an outbreak has been seemingly eradicated [29].
Failure to mitigate an outbreak as well as correspond-
ing “reemergence events” can have serious fiscal conse-
quences [50].
Biosecurity [4] can be defined as a set of tools, prac-
tices, disease prevention measures and sanitary regula-
tions designed to attenuate the spread of disease. For ex-
ample, truck washes have been shown to slow the spread
of PEDv [31]. After animal feed was identified as a vec-
tor for PEDv [17, 46] sanitation of feed using thermal
or chemical treatments helps prevent contamination [21].
In [23], the efficacy of varying degrees of biosecurity for
mitigating disease transmission was tested by comparing
“Low”, “Medium” and “High” biosecurity experimen-
tal groups, delineated by the amount of practices im-
plemented. “Medium” and “High” levels of biosecurity
were shown to outperform “Low” biosecurity treatments
in attenuating disease spread.
In realistic animal supply chain network conditions, in-
vestment in biosecurity cannot guarantee safety from an
outbreak. Although biosecurity has become an expected
norm in crop and animal based agriculture, full participa-
tion in these practices is not entirely widespread [26, 33].
Yet, increased biosecurity reduces the likelihood of dis-
ease transmission [23]. Each producer’s risk of infection is
also largely dependent upon their network [32, 48, 60, 61].
Hence, a structural equilibrium exists for optimizing wel-
fare by investing in biosecurity for outbreak mitigation.
Our simulations focus on studying participants aversion
to risk in response to perceived economic danger asso-
ciated with infectious diseases. When there is a disease
outbreak, one natural strategy is to “wait and see” how
the disease spreads before choosing to allocate resources
for protection. These scenarios have been studied with
respect to flu vaccines [2, 32]. “Wait and See strategies
were shown to exacerbate outbreaks if the vaccination
rate among the population was low. Risk averse individ-
uals, who might vaccinate early, could be perceived as
protective shields for those going unvaccinated who are
acting as free-riders. This opportunistic strategy weighs
the perceived opportunity costs of vaccination versus the
risk of infection. This behavior may benefit one’s own
facility, but can increase the chances for an epidemic
along with more extreme economic consequences across
the supply chain [6].
Computational social science focuses on leveraging
data to investigate questions regarding human decision
making, behaviors, societies and systems [3, 12, 13, 27,
34]. Many have examined decision-making using a be-
havioral economic lens. For example, the role of risk
preferences in decision-making has been widely studied
using survey methods such as multiple price lotteries
[10, 19]. One method for collecting decision-making data
is through the use of serious games, which we refer to as
digital field experiments. Digital field experiments that
use performance-based incentives can increase salience
and effort in the decision making process [8, 11]. Real
monetary payments that scale with the payouts in the ex-
perimental choices provide an incentive for participants
to act according to their true risk preferences. Incentive-
compatible experiments are the gold standard for under-
standing real-world relevant behavior [1, 5]. These exper-
iments can be hosted online to gather social interactions
and behaviors from wide audiences [7, 44].
Digital field experiments have also been used to as-
sess the efficacy of digital decision support systems. In
regards to emergency response, digital field experiments
have been shown to bolster preparedness and reduce eco-
nomic damage [38]. Interactive simulations have been
useful for studying human behavior in the face of an epi-
demic [30, 40]. Gaming simulations have also been ap-
plied for business management decision assessment [56]
as well as conceptual training of entrepreneurial strategy
[55].
In our experimental process, we intend to extract
and compare behavioral strategies that emerge over the
course of the simulation. We developed a biosecurity
adoption metric, based upon players decisions to allo-
cate resources to reduce their risk of infection. Here we
define behavioral scores using the infection rate as our
experimental variable. We calculated each participants
biosecurity adoption rating by tallying their level of pro-
tection (None, Low, Medium, or High) across each sim-
ulated year, consisting of 6 decision months. Decisions
to adopt biosecurity earlier in the year were implicitly
weighted heavier than investing at the end of the year.
Participants were informed of the probability of infection
across several high risk and low risk scenarios, in which
we also varied the amount of biosecurity in their simu-
lated network. This allowed us to compare each players
risk aversion score for both low and high probabilities of
infection as a way of measuring their behavioral response
with respect to their perceived risk.
Aggregated biosecurity adoption ratings were then cat-
egorized using clustering algorithms. Clustering algo-
rithms [62] are unsupervised learning methods for group-
ing multi-dimensional data. These are useful tools for
data exploration and can help us separate thematic be-
haviors across sampled participants game-plays Cluster-
ing allows us to group participants into distinct behav-
ioral categories from their decisions throughout the sim-
ulation. Using these analyses, we can design experiments
that can automatically group participants by their deci-
sions, predict their behaviors, and even adapt the simu-
lation based upon their group.
Several clustering algorithms have been validated for
financial risk analysis [25] and have been applied to ex-
amine behavior in experimental games [39]. Comparing
3player strategies using a clustering framework can help
identify appropriate audiences for tailoring interventions
or personalized messaging. We selected the K-Means al-
gorithm [18] to cluster the biosecurity adoption ratings
and categorize observed behaviors. Mitigation strategies,
recorded from participants game-plays, spanned from
minimally protective risk-tolerant behaviors to more cau-
tious risk averse approaches.
Here we present a framework for digitally simulating
risk scenarios to identify behavioral strategies from sam-
pled participants. These digital field experiments allow
us to test the effects of various informational stimuli and
their influence on the decision-making process. This can
also help us understand in general how perceptions of risk
and attitudes may differ across a sampled population.
Our sampled audiences vary from industry professionals
and stakeholders to the general public.
Our overarching goal is to simulate complex decision
mechanisms using digital representations of disease out-
break situations. We analyzed participant choices to
study behavioral strategies employed under different sce-
narios. To reach our goal, we designed two experiments
to quantify behavioral risk profiles associated with a
biosecurity investment response to outbreak scenarios.
Experiment One focused on identifying the most
prominent behavioral strategies associated with risk
mitigation in response to perceived economic danger.
We designed a digital field experiment [39] simulating
the budgeting of a farms biosecurity over the course of
a year during an outbreak. We recruited individuals
to participate in our digital field experiment using
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk), an online survey
marketplace recently applied for behavioral experiments
[36, 47]. In addition, specific treatments about visibility
of infection and biosecurity in the producer network
were implemented to test the following hypotheses:
(H1): More visibility in the number of infected sites
increases risk aversion.
(H2): More visibility of the amount of biosecurity in the
system increases risk taking behaviors.
In Experiment Two, we identify differences between
our audience of primary interest, industry specialists,
and the sampled population from Amazon MTurk.
Here we sought to delineate behavioral differences
between an audience with extensive knowledge of the
swine industry and those without relevant industry
experience (i.e., online recruits). We hypothesize that
industry professionals will internalize [51] and empathize
with diseased animals and/or past experiences during
outbreak situations and thus behave differently than an
audience without industry experience:
(H3): Industry professionals risk mitigation behaviors
will differ from an audience without industry experience.
To test this hypothesis, we rented a booth at the 2018
World Pork Expo in order to recruit industry profession-
als and stakeholders to compare their decision-making
strategies to an additional sample of online recruited par-
ticipants without relevant industry experience. By exam-
ining behavioral differences between audiences, we may
be able to determine how to leverage behaviors from an
easily accessible population to gain insights that apply
to a group that is logistically challenging to recruit.
METHODS
Our digital field experiments simulated the manage-
ment of a porcine facility’s biosecurity in the face of a
contagious disease. Our simulation was modeled after
[39]. Our updated version follows a similar user interface
(UI) and mechanics, with the added capability for online
deployment. Practices accepted by the University of Ver-
mont Institutional Review Board were followed for exper-
iments using human participants (University of Vermont
IRB # CHRBSS-16-232-IRB). Instructional slideshows
were presented to participants before they began play,
and were identical for both experiments. The slideshows,
describing the gaming mechanics and interface, are given
in Appendix A. We conducted two experiments.
Experiment One
We recruited 1000 participants using Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk, an online survey marketplace [43]. The digi-
tal field experiment application was built in the Unity
Development platform and hosted with WebGL [7, 45].
In Figure 1, the simulation interface conveys informa-
tion about each neighboring facility’s biosecurity level
as well as information about the facilities disease infec-
tion status. We designed our digital field experiment to
simulate the management of swine production facilities.
Players made management decisions to adapt their facil-
ity’s biosecurity during several outbreak scenarios. We
hosted our simulation online. Each participant played 32
rounds with each round consisting of up to 6 decisions.
Each decision provided the opportunity to invest simu-
lation funds towards biosecurity. One investment choice
was allotted per month costing $1000 simulation dollars,
which could be spent up to three times per simulated
year: upgrading their status from “None to Low”, “Low
to Medium” or “Medium to High”. The player was never
economically impeded from investing in biosecurity (i.e.,
this option is always available independent from their to-
tal score). If the player owned facility became infected,
the round would end and $25,000 was subtracted from
their total score. At the end of the simulation, players
4were compensated with a rate of $50,000 in game cur-
rency to $1 USD.
Figure 1: User interface. The red arrow marks an infected
facility (red dot). The player’s facility is enclosed by a trian-
gle. Each round spans 6 decision months, where the player
can remain at the current level of biosecurity or invest in in-
creased biosecurity from None to Low, Medium, and High.
An indicator for the infection status is presented to the par-
ticipant.
The network of facilities in each round includes one
player-controlled facility and 49 simulation-controlled fa-
cilities. Each computer-controlled facility in the simula-
tion was assigned a biosecurity value. The probability
of a contaminated facility infecting other premises was
scaled with distance, facility-specific biosecurity and a
predefined infection rate (Infection rates: Low (0.08) or
High (0.3)). At the close of each decision month, the
transmission probability per facility is determined using
a pseudorandom number drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion.
Each round, consisting of up to six decision months,
begins with a single infection. At the end of each month,
information about the infection’s progression is presented
to the player along with the opportunity to invest ex-
perimental funds to increase their facility’s biosecurity.
Increasing biosecurity protects the player’s facility by
dampening the infection’s transmission probability. The
probability of infection must be inferred by the player
using their information regarding the number of infec-
tions in the system, amount of biosecurity implemented
at neighboring facilities, and the infection rate, which is
clearly displayed on the user interface. Player installed
biosecurity does not depreciate over time, nor are partici-
pants given the option to decrease their biosecurity level.
If the players facility becomes infected after a decision
month, the player is alerted, $25,000 experimental dol-
lars are subtracted from their score, and the round ends
immediately. The simulation then progresses to the next
year with a new initial infection and spatial distribution
of producers, and the player owned facilitys biosecurity
level is reset to “None”.
Our simulation tested the effects of concealing informa-
tion about infection status as well as the amount of biose-
curity in the system at each of the computer-generated
production facilities. In this way, we injected informa-
tion uncertainty into the decision-making process, expos-
ing each participant to a variety of risk scenarios. This
allows us to test for differences in behavior given more
or less information regarding infection status and/or the
amount of biosecurity present at neighboring farms.
Participants played multiple rounds with treatments
that varied the infection dynamics as well as the visibil-
ity of neighboring facilities infection status and biosecu-
rity level. In one quarter of all rounds, the number of
infections and biosecurity status of each facility was fully
visible to the participant. The remaining 75% injected
uncertainty into the decision making process by con-
cealing information regarding either the infection and/or
biosecurity statuses across the production network. The
neighboring facilities were all present on the user inter-
face, however either the infection indicators and/or biose-
curity statuses remain ‘gray, indicating unknown. These
treatments were incorporated to consider how the pres-
ence of uncertainty and increased risk of infection can
affect players decisions.
Each treatment was played twice, once with biosecu-
rity values drawn from a Low biosecurity distribution and
once with values drawn from a High biosecurity distribu-
tion. The Low biosecurity distribution generated biose-
curity values for each facility drawn with 60% chance
for ‘None’ rated at 0, a 32% chance of ‘Low’ (1), a 6%
chance at ‘Medium’ (2), and a 2% chance at ‘High’ (3).
The High distribution randomly pulled biosecurity val-
ues with a 60% chance for ‘High’ (3), a 32% chance of
‘Medium’ (2), a 6% chance at ‘Low’ (1), and a 2% chance
at ‘None’ (0). Our treatments consisted of all permuta-
tions of Low, High biosecurity distributions against un-
certainty in both infection information and amount of
biosecurity in the system (i.e., 25% full information, 25%
biosecurity obscured, 25% infection obscured, 25% no in-
fection or biosecurity information). This accounted for
182,124 biosecurity investment decisions collected from
the 1,000 participants. Our clustering analysis grouped
each of these treatment scenarios in order to compare
the overall comparative risk associated with each players
choices. We then grouped decision data during high and
low information obscurity to test our behavioral hypothe-
ses (H1,H2). The particular effects of these treatments
on the decision making process were further explored in
[39].
Each decision has an associated risk, based upon the
amount of biosecurity implemented at the players facility
and severity of the infection rate. The infection spreads
to more facilities per month, each of which can infect
the player’s facility. Biosecurity investments reduce in-
fection rates for the entire round, hence, earlier adoption
of biosecurity leads to reduced risk throughout the six
5month round. Players can invest their simulated earnings
to reduce their risk of infection, or take a chance with a
lower disease protection and a possibly higher end-round
payout.
Each participants decisions were assigned biosecurity
adoption ratings depending on the amount of biosecu-
rity they implemented during the simulation. More risk
averse strategies choose to increase biosecurity earlier
within the simulated year, while risk tolerant strategies
allocate fewer experimental dollars to biosecurity in a
gamble for a higher payout. Every individual, i, was as-
signed a biosecurity adoption rating, Ri, computed using
decisions, d ∈ Di, from each simulated month. Each par-
ticipants risk score is calculated by tallying the player
facilitys level of biosecurity, bd ∈ {0 = “None”, 1 =
“Low”, 2 = “Medium” , 3 = “High” } across each sim-
ulated year and then normalizing by the total number of
player decisions, |Di|:
Ri =
1
|Di|
∑
d∈Di
bd (1)
for each decision, d, of the ith player. The biosecu-
rity adoption rating, Ri, increases as the player invests
in more biosecurity, which decreases their risk of infec-
tion. This means that investments in biosecurity that
occur in earlier months carry more weight, because early
investments increase a facilitys protection for the remain-
der of the round (i.e., each decision month). The most
risk averse strategy is characterized by those participants
that consistently invested substantial funds into biosecu-
rity during the early months of each round.
We clustered these strategies using a K-means clus-
tering algorithm [18] implemented with the Python pro-
gramming language [58]. Graphics were created using
matplotlib [20]. Here, the clustering coefficient, K, is the
number of unique clusters assumed for each analysis. We
chose K = 3, using the elbow method (Figure 2), as it
optimizes the sum of the square errors across cluster cen-
ters [24, 41] and produces the most pronounced scheme
of observed behavior.
The perceived risk attitudes of each recruited partici-
pant were calculated using each of their investment deci-
sions. Each player’s two dimensional biosecurity adop-
tion rating was calculated from each of their invest-
ment decisions aggregated from two datasets: (1) deci-
sions made given rounds with Low infection rates, and
(2) decisions made in rounds with High infection rates,
~Ri = (Ri(Low), Ri(High)). We tested the effects of re-
stricting information regarding the presence of infection
as well the visibility of biosecurity statuses of neighbor-
ing facilities. This injected uncertainty into the decision
making process. Using the biosecurity adoption ratings
as a measure of risk, we test for a significant difference
Figure 2: For each clustering coefficient, K, the sum of
the squared errors are plotted using participant’s Biosecurity
Adoption Ratings, ~Ri
in the distributions using one-tailed Mann-Whitney U
tests [35]. This non-parametric test was chosen since
each distribution of biosecurity adoption ratings failed
D’Agostino and Pearson’s test for normality [15, 16].
Experiment 2
To test for a difference in strategy by audience, we
directly compared decisions of two groups: Amazon Me-
chanical Turk and industry professional participants. For
this analysis, we used a Biosecurity Investment version
of our digital field experiment that featured a single in-
fection rate across 32 rounds (i.e., simulated infection
scenarios).
We hosted a booth at the 2018 American World Pork
Expo [14] and recruited 50 participants with knowledge
of the swine industry including business owners, produc-
tion managers, laborers, animal health experts and en-
thusiasts. In contrast, this simulation featured a constant
infection rate (0.15), an intermediate value between the
low (0.08) and high (0.3) infection rates tested in Exper-
iment One. This allowed us to collect sufficient obser-
vations for a statistical comparison, while decreasing the
total participation time, which aided in our enrollment.
We also recruited 50 Amazon Mechanical Turk partici-
pants to play this digital field experiment. Each audience
type played 32 rounds with 6 decision months per round,
thus providing 9,600 decisions per audience type. Deci-
sions by each group were compared using a two sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [37]. At the end of the
simulation, Mturk recruits were compensated with a rate
of $23,500 in simulation currency to $1 USD. We paid a
higher rate for participants at the World Pork Expo in
order to bolster participation: $12,000 simulation dollars
to $1 USD.
6RESULTS
Experiment One
In Figure 3, we clustered each participants biosecurity
adoption ratings using K-means clustering with K = 3.
The circles represent each players two dimensional risk
attitude rating, ~Ri = (Ri(Low), Ri(High)). The diamonds
portray the center of each cluster. The x axis scores their
decisions using a low infection rate (0.08) while the y axis
represents scores from a high infection rate (0.3). Near
the origin, (0,0) players adopted very little biosecurity
during the experiment. In the upper right corner, players
adopted the most biosecurity for both infection rates.
Each point (or cluster) shows how differently a players
decisions behaved in the two treatments. Points close to
the main diagonal (dotted black line along y = x) do not
modify their behavior in response to the game context
(e.g., always or never investing in increased biosecurity),
while those points off the main diagonal show players who
differ their behavior in response to opportunities in game
situations. The bottom right quadrant is empty, as these
scores represent nonsensical behavior (i.e., only adopting
high biosecurity on low risk rounds and low biosecurity
on high risk rounds).
Cluster 1 () made the most risk averse biosecurity in-
vestment decisions. They adopted the most biosecurity,
for both low and high infection rates, in comparison to
the other clusters. Cluster 2 () took the opposite ap-
proach, adopting the least amount of biosecurity in both
dimensions. These risk tolerant participants attempted
to maximize their payouts using a minimal biosecurity
investment strategy.
Cluster 3 () , the opportunists, adopted more biose-
curity with a high infection rate and little to no biose-
curity with the low rate. Some cautious members of this
group purchased more biosecurity than the risk averse
group (Cluster 1) during highly contagious rounds. This
group of players is characterized by a balance between
risky behavior when the probability of transmission was
dampened and more conservative choices when presented
with a higher risk of infection. They behave similarly to
the risk-tolerant during low infection rates, and appear
more risk averse during highly infectious rounds.
For reference, the optimal or risk neutral strategies
can be quantified from the end of round earnings (E =
$15, 000), probability of infection (pi), cost associated
with becoming infected (Ci = $25, 000) and cost of
biosecurity (bc = $1, 000 per level). We ran several
hundred trials given each level of biosecurity to esti-
mate the probability of infection given each biosecurity
Figure 3: Participant biosecurity adoption ratings are clus-
tered using the K-means algorithm with K = 3. The circles
represent each players two dimensional risk attitude rating,
~Ri = (Ri(Low), Ri(High)). The diamonds portray the cen-
ter of each cluster. The x axis scores their decisions using
a low infection rate (0.08) while the y axis represents scores
from a high infection rate (0.3). Near the origin, (0,0) players
adopted very little biosecurity during their game-play. In the
upper right corner, players adopted the most biosecurity for
both infection rates. Points close to the main diagonal do
not modify their behavior in response to the game context,
while points off the main diagonal show players who differ
their behavior in response to simulated opportunities.
level. The expected return (E) for each biosecurity adop-
tion choice was calculated in experimental dollars as:
E = (E − bc) ∗ (1 − pi)(pi ∗ Ci). In Table I we show
the expected return for biosecurity adoption choice with
respect to infection rate. We see that a minimum biose-
curity status of Low during Low infection rates and a
“High biosecurity status during High Infection rates are
the most optimal choices for producing the highest ex-
pected returns.
Expected Earnings Expected Earnings
Biosecurity Level Low Infection Rate (pi) High Infection Rate (pi)
None $12,204.30 (7%) -$1,729.22 (41.8%)
Low $12,357.89 (4.2%) -$2,044.30 (41.1%)
Medium $11,400.00 (4.2%) $400.00 (33.2%)
High $11,406.42 (1.6%) $4,857.91 (19.3%)
Table I: Biosecurity Level Expected Returns: Expected
Returns in experimental dollars for each level of biosecurity
adopted. The probability of infection (pi) is estimated using
several hundred trials at each specified biosecurity level. Re-
call, the the probability of infection depends on the infection
rate and distance to each infected facility.
In Fig 4 we highlight the differences in these observed
7behaviors with histograms of each clusters decisions to
invest in biosecurity as a function of decision month.
Here, the risk tolerant adopt little biosecurity for both
low and high infection rates, while risk averse players
tend to frequently increase protection. The opportunists
mirror risk-tolerant behavior when the infection rate is
low and appear more risk averse when infection rate was
presented as high. We can show this by comparing distri-
butions by computing their KullbackLeibler (KL) diver-
gence [22]. When comparing the monthly distributions of
biosecurity investment decisions, [No Biosecurity, Low,
Medium, High], from Opportunists (OP) versus Risk Tol-
erant (RT) during low infection rates, we found:
DKL(OP || RT) = [0.0002, 0.052, 0.0482, 0.045]
Similarly, when comparing Opportunists (OP) to the
Risk Averse (RA) group during high infection rates we
find:
DKL(OP || RA) = [0.0005, 0.04, 0.0351, 0.0186]
This helps justify our intuition regarding the similarities
between these groups under these conditions.
To test hypotheses (H1,H2), we first investigated how
the risk cluster distributions, {Risk Averse (RA), Risk
Tolerant (RT), Opportunistic (O)}, may change with re-
spect to each set of information visibility treatments. We
calculated each participants two-dimensional risk scores,
(Ri(Low), Ri(High)), for each group of visibility treat-
ments and then re-categorized each participants biose-
curity adoption rating using the centroids defined from
the full decision space (see Figure 3). We then applied a
KS test to compare the differences in behavioral groups
between treatments.
For infection visibility information treatments (H1) the
change in clustered distributions was not significant (KS
D = 0.045, p = 0.257, two tailed). However, we did find
more risk averse behaviors during full infection visibility
treatments (395 RA, 207 RT, 398 O) compared to low in-
fection visibility (350 RA, 290 RT, 360 O). See Figure SI
1 for additional graphs showing the clustered risk scores
per visibility treatment.
For biosecurity information treatments (H2), we found
a significant difference (KS D = 0.08, p < 0.005, two-
tailed) in the clustered distributions when comparing
treatments with full visibility of neighboring biosecurity
(322 RA, 290 RT, 388 O) to low biosecurity visibility
(402 RA, 207 RT, 391 O). This lends support to (H2),
as we see more risk taking behaviors with more visibil-
ity of biosecurity in the system. This helps justify our
intuition regarding the similarities between these groups
under these conditions.
Figure 4: Histograms of the proportions of all decisions to remain with no biosecurity (“None”) or increase from None - to
Low - Medium - and finally to High as a function of decision month. Biosecurity can only increase one level per month. Less
biosecurity was implemented when the infection rate, pinf , was Low ( = 0.08); the number of decisions to invest in biosecurity
increased with higher infection rates. The Risk tolerant cluster (left column) implements the least biosecurity, while the Risk
Averse cluster (right column) invests the most biosecurity under both infection rates. After attaining a High biosecurity level,
no more decisions can be logged for the simulated year, which is why most of the decisions from the risk averse cluster are
completed by the third decision month. The Opportunistic cluster (middle column) behave like the risk averse group under
high infection rate scenarios, and implement less biosecurity during low infection rates.
8In order to formally investigate hypotheses (H1) and
(H2), we computed each participants aggregate biosecu-
rity adoption rating across both the low and high infec-
tion rates for each set of information treatments. To test
(H1), we examined whether more visibility in the number
of infected sites increased risk aversion. To accomplish
this, we measure each participants biosecurity adoption
rating during 16 treatments in which the infection sta-
tus of neighboring facilities was visible {median=1.40,
µ = 1.40, σ = 0.62, min = 0, max = 2.50}, versus
16 treatments with hidden infection statuses {median =
1.31, µ = 1.30, σ = 0.69, min = 0, max = 2.50} . Using
the Mann-Whitney U Test, we found the distributions of
biosecurity adoption ratings differed significantly, with
more biosecurity being implemented when the infection
status was fully visible (MannWhitney U = 541840.5,
n1 = n2 = 1000, p < 0.001, one-tailed).
For (H2) we tested if more visibility of the amount of
biosecurity in the system increases risk taking behaviors.
We similarly compare 16 treatments in which biosecurity
was visible {median=1.27, µ = 1.27, σ = 0.63, min = 0,
max = 2.50} versus 16 treatments in which the neigh-
boring biosecurity statuses were hidden {median=1.45,
µ = 1.43, σ = 0.66, min = 0, max = 2.50}. This dif-
ference in biosecurity adoption ratings between distribu-
tions was significant, with less biosecurity being imple-
mented during treatments in which neighboring biosecu-
rity statuses were visible (MannWhitney U = 429424.0,
n1 = n2 = 1000, p < 0.001, one-tailed).
Experiment Two
To test (H3), compared the decisions made by indus-
try professionals recruited at the 2018 World Pork Expo
to the decisions made by workers from Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk. In Figure 5, the risk aversion distributions are
given for both the Amazon Mechanical Turk {µ = 1.41,
σ = 0.71, median=1.34 , min = 0.02, max = 2.50} and
World Pork Expo {µ = 1.36, σ = 0.66, median=1.31,
min = 0.13, max = 2.50} audiences. Using a two sample
KS test, we found (D = 0.16, p = 0.51, n1 = n2 = 50),
leading us to fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
two distributions of two samples are the same. Results
did not detect a difference in the spectrum of behavioral
strategies from sampled online participants and agricul-
tural professionals under our risk aversion metric. For
comparison, we also find the same result using a two
tailed Man Whitney U Test (U = 1180.0, p = 0.63, two-
tailed, n1 = n2 = 50).
DISCUSSION
In this study and in other published works [6, 39, 40]
we have demonstrated the potential value of using dig-
Figure 5: Biosecurity Adoption Ratings from 50 industry
professionals who attended the 2018 World Pork Expo were
compared to 50 participants recruited online from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Each participant’s rating (Ri) was calcu-
lated from a single infection rate (0.15) across 192 decision
months for a total of 19,200 choices.
ital field experiments as a data gathering tool for use
in categorizing behavioral strategies. Our experimental
framework focuses on creating a digital representation of
a complex decision mechanism in order to identify preva-
lent behavioral strategies.
Digital field experiments are readily applicable for de-
signing controlled settings for collecting assessments of
tasks in response to changing visual stimuli [40]. In Ex-
periment One, we created a personalized metric for com-
paring each player’s risk mitigation decision strategy and
identified three distinct behaviors. We tested how risk
communication and information accessibility of both the
disease infection status and neighboring biosecurity pro-
tection efforts affect this decision-making process.
In Experiment One we analyzed strategies from 1000
Amazon Mechanical Turk recruits using the K-means
clustering algorithm. Derivative projects can consider
implementing other clustering algorithms for comparison.
We grouped the decisions of all participants without con-
sidering their demographics. Future studies can incorpo-
rate data collected from post-game interactive surveys,
such as each participants age or sex.
Gaming simulations for education, or edutainment are
more dominant for cognitive gain outcomes as contrasted
9with traditional learning methods [59]. Our framework
may also be adapted to create educational tools featur-
ing risk messaging and communication. Feedback on the
consequences of the decision making process can help a
player learn from their past decisions. We can also use
these educational tools for data gathering and testing the
effects of presenting risk communication strategies with
respect to a complex decision mechanism. Since these
applications can be hosted online, they can allow us to
collect inputs from a wide audience for computational
social science research applications, while also providing
educational value to the players.
We tested the effects of information uncertainty with
regards to the infection and biosecurity status of neigh-
boring farms. In (H1) we found more visibility in the
number of infected sites results in an increase in the biose-
curity adoption rating distribution (i.e., more risk averse
behaviors). This is intuitive as there is more perceived
risk when the participant can see the spread of the dis-
ease over the course of the year. This feedback appears
to invoke more risk averse behaviors in our sample. In
(H2) we found more visibility in the amount biosecurity
implemented throughout the system increases risk toler-
ant behaviors. This could be due in part to the free-rider
effect in which some participants venture for a higher
payout by exploiting their neighboring biosecurity sta-
tus, perceived as a shield from the infection.
While Amazon Mechanical Turk provided a tool for
fast recruitment of many participants for our experi-
ment, we assume that, based on the overall rate of em-
ployment in agriculture, most online participants were
not currently working in an agricultural field. There-
fore, their decisions may potentially differ from experi-
enced industry professionals. Experiment Two focused
on comparing the decisions from industry professionals
and stakeholders to a random sample of participants re-
cruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We did not find
evidence to support (H3). No difference was detected in
the proportion of observed risk scores of the two cohorts.
This may be in part due to our relatively small sample
size, approximately 20,000 decisions spanning 100 par-
ticipants, which was in part due to the difficulty in ob-
taining decision-making data from industry profession-
als. Through survey methods, [49] found farm owners
self-identified as generally more risk tolerant in compari-
son to the general public, however were more risk averse
in comparison to non-farm business owners. Our simula-
tion was framed specifically for outbreak mitigation and
resource allocation, which may have influenced the risk
tolerance of farm owners due to the internalization of the
economic consequences of their decisions.
Naturally, we may expect some differences in how an
experienced industry professional approaches these simu-
lated risk scenarios, given any real-world past experiences
mitigating their disease risk. However this data, suggest
that the underlying behavioral distributions are compa-
rable under our risk aversion metric. Since experimental
data from industry professionals is difficult and costly to
gather at scale, these results lend credence to behavioral
results from data collected using a convenience sample of
online recruited participants for analyzing behavior even
if the participants lack insider knowledge of the industry
being studied.
Effective risk communication strategies are essential
for crisis aversion and mitigation [53]. In particular,
outreach messaging strategies may need constant adap-
tations in order to improve compliance at critical mo-
ments to minimizing outbreaks [52]. Online recruitment
of participants can be used to rapidly gather data for
testing the efficacy of risk messaging strategies. Com-
paring their decision strategies to industry professionals
and stakeholders helps leverage our findings. This frame-
work can help us study behavioral mechanisms leading
to more proactive risk management. These interven-
tions can then be further tested using simulation model-
ing, such as agent-based modeling approaches to forecast
their effect on systemic contagion dynamics [6]. Addi-
tionally, this framework can be leveraged to study risk
aversion with respect to other behavioral strategies or
to investigate the sensitivity of behavioral responses and
how they change over time (i.e., learning effects).
Implications of these results for the industry itself in-
clude the need to appreciate the heterogeneity along the
risk aversion and risk tolerance spectrum that is appar-
ent, not just in Amazon Mechanical Turk participants,
but industry professionals. Risk communication and in-
centive strategies likely need to be tailored for specific
populations of industry producers. In our study, we fo-
cused on analyzing risk aversion with respect to biose-
curity investment and disease prevention, since this ob-
jective decision making process can impact the wellbe-
ing of these agricultural systems. Those producers who
tend to be more risk averse, in general, may only need
basic information regarding risks of disease and conse-
quences to be incentivized into action. Other, more risk
tolerant populations, may require mandates to motivate
change. Those producers who take a more situational
approach, who essentially learn as they interpret changes
in standard operating procedure over time, may benefit
from extended learning and training opportunities. In
future simulations, the use of incentives to nudge par-
ticipants toward higher levels of biosecurity investment
should be tested as a potential intervention for this popu-
lation. Both the risk tolerant and the risk averse popula-
tions were reluctant to change strategies and may require
larger incentives (higher penalties for a disease strike or
higher monetary incentives to adopt biosecurity) or the
use of regulatory power to improve resistance to disease
incursion and ensure system resilience.
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CONCLUSION
Digital field experiments can provide insights into a
wide variety of social ecological systems and further, data
collected can be used to provide inputs to digital decision
support systems. Interfaces can be adapted for a wide va-
riety of applications. Recruitment of participants can be
rapidly assembled using web hosted platforms. Tailored
interfaces that simulate real-world decisions can control
information variability to capture the choices of individ-
uals.
Digital field experiments can improve upon traditional
survey methods using immersive simulations for tracking
human behavior. Online survey recruitment tools, like
Amazon Mechanical Turk, can assist in expediting re-
cruitment for conducting digital field experiments. Our
results validate using online participants for accelerating
behavioral studies. We affirm this by comparing behav-
iors to a convenience sample of industry professionals,
which can be more difficult to recruit. Further validation
should be conducted to compare results from industry
professionals to online recruited audiences.
Applying a clustering algorithm to our risk aversion
metric (Eq. 1) helped us identify the most prominent
behaviors exhibited by our sampled participants. We
uncovered three distinct strategic clusters using a risk
aversion scale to categorize participant’s decision-making
behavior. Risk averse participants invested the most re-
sources to protect their facility, regardless of the infection
rate. Risk tolerant players would invest little to nothing
in biosecurity regardless of the communicated infection
rate. Opportunists would take their chances with little
protection when the infection rate was low, but invested
in high protection when their perceived risk of infection
increased. The opportunists were the most responsive
to information provided. Identifying these types of be-
haviors may be beneficial for more targeted information
campaigns in order to promote more resilient and health-
ier systems [6].
Our categorization of risk tolerant, opportunistic and
risk averse strategies can help us model agricultural de-
cisions and the ramifications of interventions that seek
to alter behavior. Digital field experiments can be ap-
plied to test the efficacy of risk communication infor-
mation campaigns. Incentives can be incorporated into
our simulations to test the effects of nudging [54] pop-
ulations towards healthier risk management practices.
Identifying realistic decision response distributions from
tested human behaviors can help modeling approaches
find system-wide optimal biosecurity resource allocation
for outbreak mitigation.
Behavioral clustering has value because it allows us to
identify a wide spectrum of behaviors and consider tar-
geted interventions to groups who are more responsive to
risk communication. People in both the risk averse and
risk tolerant clusters, which make up 59.3% of the tested
population, do not appear to readily change behavior
with additional information. These categories show re-
calcitrant behavior, and may be indicative of individuals
that are set in their ways. These populations are likely
the most difficult populations to nudge towards alternate,
and more productive pathways. Behavioral interventions
of these populations will likely require substantial effort
with associated costs and may not provide movement to-
wards the desired outcomes. Yet changing communica-
tion strategy by altering disease and biosecurity commu-
nication strategies (H1 and H2) confirms that shifts in
behavior are possible. We suggest that interventions may
be best targeted towards those identified as risk oppor-
tunists because they are likely to change their behavior
as information is modified. Further work can examine if
messaging may differentially effect specific clusters, and
thus, provide support for nuanced behavioral nudges de-
signed to impact specific subsets of society.
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Supplementary materials
APPENDIX A: GAME-PLAY INFORMATION
The instructional slide show of “Protocol Adoption” gaming simulations presented to each participant. A demo of
the game is hosted online at:
(https://segs.w3.uvm.edu/demos/protocol)
Welcome	to	the	experiment.		The	
following	slide	show	will	guide	you	
through	the	simulation.
Press	the	enter/return	key	or	touch	
the	screen	to	advance.
This	material	is	based	upon	work	that	is	supported	by	the	National	Institute	of	Food	and	
Agriculture,	U.S.	Department	of	Agriculture,	under	award	number	2015-69004-23273.
Any	opinions,	findings,	conclusions,	or	recommendations	expressed	in	this	publication	are	
those	of	the	author(s)	and	do	not	necessarily	reflect	the	view	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Agriculture.
Welcome	to	an	experiment	about	the	economics	of	decision	
making.	In	the	course	of	the	experiment,	you	will	have	
several	opportunities	to	earn	money.	Any	money	earned	
during	this	experiment	will	initially	be	recorded	as	
experimental	dollars.	At	the	end	of	this	experiment,	we	will	
convert	your	experimental	dollars	into	actual	US	dollars.	The	
more	experimental	dollars	you	earn	the	more	actual	US	
dollars	you	will	receive	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.
At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	your	earnings	will	be	
converted	at	a	rate	of	$1	US	dollar	for	$23,500	experimental	
dollars.	
Overview	
In	today’s	experiment,	you	will	participate	in	a	number	of	
rounds,	each	designed	to	mimic	decisions	made	over	the	
period	of	six	months.	Each	round	is	independent,	meaning	
that	decisions	during	a	round	do	not	affect	future	rounds	in	
any	way.	The	only	value	that	gets	carried	over	across	
rounds	is	your	cumulative	profit,	which	will	be	used	to	
calculate	your	payout	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	
http://www.schickenterprises.com/visipork/
Pork	Production	
Today	you	will	be	operating	as	a	pork	producer,	responsible	
for	managing	a	hog	production	facility.	
Infectious	disease
An	unnamed	infectious	disease,	that	is	spread	through	the	
air,	is	a	risk	in	the	region	of	the	country	where	your	facility	
is	located.	
Distance	from	infection
Because	the	infectious	disease	is	airborne,	the	farther	your	
facility	is	from	an	infected	facility	the	less	likely	your	facility	
is	to	contract	the	disease.	
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Animal	health	protection	protocols
Animal	health	protection	protocols	can	be	purchased	
to	help	reduce	the	likelihood	of	your	animals	catching	a	
disease.	Animal	health	protection	protocols	can	only	be	
increased	one	level	per	month;		from	None	to	Low,	Low	
to	Medium,	then	Medium	to	High.		As	more	protocols	
are	purchased,	your	facility’s	animal	health	Protection	
Level will	increase.	The	higher	the	animal	health	
Protection	Level the	less	likely	a	facility’s	animals	will	
become	infected.	
Improving	your	facility’s	animal	health	
protection	protocols	costs	money
• Part	of	your	managerial	role	will	be	to	decide	
how	much	to	invest	in	animal	health	
protection	to	attempt	to	keep	your	animals	
healthy.	
http://www.schickenterprises.com/visipork/
Infection	Cost	
• If	your	facility	becomes	infected,	all	your	
livestock	will	be	culled,	and	you	will	lose	all	
profits	for	that	year.
• Upon	infection,	$25,000.00	USD	will	be	
subtracted	from	your	score	and	the	next	
round	will	begin
User	Interface
15
The	upper	box	provides	basic	information,	such	as	current	month,	
current	round	profit,	and	your	animal	health	Protection	Level. The	black	triangle	surrounds	your	facility
Your	facility
Also	displayed	is	a	map	of	the	facilities	in	the	region.	The	legend	
describes	the	two	pieces	of	information	that	are	available	about	each	of	
the	50	facilities	in	your	region.
The	two	pieces	of	information	are	noted	by	a	box	and	a	circle.	The	box	
indicates	animal	health	Protection	Level	and	the	circle	indicates	
infection	status.	
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A	black	circle	indicates	that	animals	are	not	infected.	 A	red	circle	indicates	that	animals	are	infected.	
If	your	facility	becomes	infected,	the	current	
year	will	end	and	you	will	be	prompted	to	start	
the	next	round.
The	color	of	the	box	changes	from	black	(no	protection)	to	
brown	to	green	as	animal	health	Protection	level	increases	
(improves)	by	purchasing	protection
Low
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The	color	of	the	box	changes	from	black	(no	protection)	to	
brown	to	green	as	animal	health	Protection	level	increases	
(improves)	by	purchasing	protection
High
To	increase	your	animal	protection	level,	you	can	purchase	
protection	using	the	button	in	the	upper	right	corner.	Recall	
that	there	is	a	maximum	of	one	increase	per	month.
Practice	rounds
• You	will	have	one	practice	round	(six-month	
period)	to	get	used	to	playing	the	game
• The	money	you	make	or	lose	during	the	
practice	round	will	not	be	added	to	your		
experimental	dollar	totals
At	the	end	of	all	rounds,	you	will	be	
asked	to	complete	a	quick	survey.
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APPENDIX B: INFORMATION VISIBILITY CLUSTER COMPARISON
Figure 6: Participant biosecurity adoption ratings are clustered for each set of visibility treatments. Cluster 1 are Risk
Averse (green), Cluster 2 are Risk Tolerant (red) and Cluster 3 are Opportunistic (yellow). The top row compares Low
neighboring biosecurity visibility (i.e., high uncertainty) to high biosecurity visibility. The bottom row compares infection
visibility treatments. We found a significant difference in the clustered risk distributions for biosecurity visibility treatments.
Histograms explicitly show the cluster differences between information uncertainty treatments.
